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This piece synthesizes the development strategies of Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Vietnam and draws some relevant lessons. Using a complex adaptive systems approach, 
strategic openness, a set of heterodox macroeconomic policies, creation of institutions 
for productive investment in both agriculture and industry, avoidance of severe 
inequalities and political conflict, special initial conditions and willingness to learn from 
unexpected developments are found to be some of these factors. Although no country 
can succeed by following mechanically the experience of another country cautious 
experimentation, rapid feedback and flexible, pragmatic policy-making with a strategic 
medium to long run perspective, can be helpful. Dynamic learning and flexible 
institution building are essential components of such a strategic approach to 
development. 
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Keynes, writing in a biographical essay on Edgeworth in 1926, underlined some of the 
problems of complex human systems: 
We are faced at every turn with problems of organic unity, of 
discreteness, of discontinuity—the whole is not equal to the sum of the 
parts, comparisons of quantity fail us, small changes produce large 
effects, the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are 
not satisfied (Keynes 1971-9: 261). 
If anything, the developing part of the world economy today highlights an even greater 
degree the kind of complexity captured in Keynes’s words above. Fortunately, systems 
and economic theory have both made some progress since those dark days. Although a 
genuinely complete theory of complex economic systems is still far off, efforts are 
underway that have already borne some interesting fruit in several limited areas.1 The 
set of four essays on country experiences under review here can be seen as case studies 
that reveal many facets of complex developing economies—each with its own sub-
systemic characteristics to be sure, but also sharing some common strategic features. 
The purpose of this note is to synthesize from a strategic perspective—to the extent it is 
possible to do so—the development experiences of these four countries (South Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam) and draw some appropriate lessons. 
However, some clarification of the key term ‘development’ is necessary in order to 
avoid ambiguities and confusion. In the rest of this study, I refer to three concepts of 
development that are implicit in the essays under discussion. The first is the notion of 
development as growth with some structural change or at least the assumption that this 
type of growth is the most crucial condition necessary for development. The second 
concept is derived by adding explicit distributional elements to growth, particularly 
inequality and poverty. Both these ideas are shared by these authors, at least implicitly. 
Warr (2008) is the most explicit in discussing all three—growth, absolute poverty and 
inequality—and his thoughtful essay alerts the reader to the performance of Thailand in 
all three areas and derives, at least partly, a logic of further necessary reforms following 
from his cogent analysis of the three aspects of development in this sense. He 
concludes: 
Not all aspects of the Thai development strategy have been similarly 
successful.  …Inequality has increased at the same time as absolute 
poverty has declined. The underlying causes of this increase in inequality 
are still not well understood (Warr 2008: 22).2 
The third—and the broadest approach to development discussed here—is in terms of 
Sen’s idea of capabilities and its further extensions. In this view, development is really 
an extension over time and space of freedom, particularly the positive freedom to lead 
the type of life the individual has reason to value. None of the essays, as far as I am able 
to judge, adopts this view explicitly. Yet, in so far as there is a normative aspect about 
development being a ‘(public) good’ that is a premise for the whole project, such a view 
is consistent with the analyses of these essays. Warr’s essay again is most explicit in 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Khan (2004a, 2004b, 2003a, 1998, 1997) and the references therein. 
2   See also Warr (1993, 1999, 2005) for nuanced analyses of the various aspects of Thailand’s 
development experience and Jomo (2007, 1995) for Malaysia. 2 
mentioning both the positive achievements and the shortcomings of Thailand’s record 
and its strategy which can fit into this broad systemic capabilities approach. The other 
essays do this by implications as well. In fact, Keun Lee’s perceptive comments on the 
possible role of democracy in development extends considerably the terrain of 
discussion in the direction of the ‘development as freedom’ perspective when he writes: 
We see obvious advantages in democracy, amongst which is the 
convenient feature that citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest and 
torture. Truly strong states get it wrong more often than they get it right. 
Thus the military dictatorships of Latin America left little in the way of 
legacy, whereas the military dictatorships in Korea and Taiwan (while 
not on anything like the same scale of brutality) left a powerful legacy of 
development. The difference lies clearly in strategic orientation and in 
institutional capacity in formulating and implementing a program of 
national industrial development. Our point is that this is an option 
available to the political leadership of any developing country today. On 
top of this, the key to the Korean or Asian success was institutional 
longevity (Lee 2008: 13). 
It would seem, therefore, that there is an implicit agreement that development is ‘growth 
plus’ other things. While the list of ‘other things’ may vary somewhat, none of the 
authors would want to equate growth and development. Yet, as all four papers attempt 
to show that generating high growth may be a useful means towards development. All 
four papers also pay some attention to what can be called ‘the political economy of 
growth’. Here the paper by Jomo and Wee is the most explicit, followed by Thoburn’s 
paper and then Lee’s.  
Synthesizing the experiences of the four countries further reveals some common 
strategic orientations as well as the effects of changes in external environment and shifts 
in policies over time. This is consistent with the characteristics of complex economic 
systems which are nonlinear with multiple equilibria and path dependence. Over time, 
one may observe the emergence of structural shifts in some cases, stagnation in other 
cases depending on initial conditions, strategies, policies and external environment, 
among other things. In the four cases discussed here, there are many specific variations 
within each. However, they also share, to various degrees, many specific features listed 
below. 
Strategic openness 
Strategic openness is evident to various degrees, with Thailand being the most open and 
Vietnam3 the least. But in all cases there is a strategic commitment to export promotion 
and further goals of moving up the value added ladder. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that there can be a ‘fallacy of composition’(Cline 1982; Khan 1983; Mayer 
2002; Razmi and Blecker 2006) in claiming that all that the developing countries need 
to do is to pursue an export-led growth policy. Reciprocal demands may not exist 
sufficiently and the ensuing competition for export markets in developed countries may 
create winners as well as losers. Therefore, what may be needed in the future for other 
                                                 
3   However, see Thoburn et al. (2007) for an insightful and nuanced discussion of Vietnam’s trade-
orientation and policies for the textiles sector. 3 
aspiring countries is a strategic approach that includes the development of national and 
regional markets and the creation of dynamic comparative advantage along with a 
number of other policies and institution-building processes described below. 
Heterodox macroeconomic policies for stability4 
Here Malaysia, Vietnam and Korea display more of a mix of heterodox policies than 
Thailand. It seems that the rigidity of the Washington consensus particularly in this area 
is rejected by the experiences of developing economies like Korea, Malaysia and 
Vietnam.  
Creation of institutions for productive investment 
The creation of institutions for productive investment exists in all four countries, but 
Korea seems to have gone much further than others much earlier. Starting with the 
reforms in the 1960s, it moved through several successive stages and is now trying to 
find an appropriate technological niche in a world that is moving towards a convergence 
of information, bio and nano technologies by 2050. The role of state in the creation of 
these institutions is still very prominent. 
Agricultural development 
All four countries put enough of an emphasis but Vietnam probably put through the 
most egalitarian pro-peasant development policies earlier. But Korea also had an 
egalitarian land reform after the end of Japanese colonialism.  
Warr (2008: 12) describes the importance of agriculture in the Thai case: 
The results of the analysis indicate that agriculture’s contribution to 
economic growth in Thailand included impressive rates of TFP growth. 
But its main contribution occurred through releasing resources which 
could be used more productively elsewhere, while still maintaining 
output, rather than through expansion of agricultural output. It is 
seriously wrong to characterize Thai agriculture as ‘stagnant’, based 
merely on the fact that output growth is slower in agriculture than in 
other sectors. If agriculture had really been ‘stagnant’ economic growth 
would have been substantially lower because it would not have been 
possible to raise productivity significantly within agriculture or to release 
resources massively while still maintaining moderate growth of output. 
Vietnam’s reforms in agriculture are evaluated by Thoburn (2008) in the following 
words: 
Rice, indeed, is the great success story of the agricultural reforms. 
Vietnam changed from being a net importer of rice in the 1980s to the 
world’s third largest exporter (after the US and Thailand) in the mid-
1990s, though there has been little further export growth since the late 
1990s, particularly compared to other products. … This lack of growth is 
not necessarily surprising or a sign of failure. In the late 1990s, when rice 
                                                 
4   See Jomo and Nagaraj (2001) for a good discussion of heterodoxy in this context. 4 
export growth was peaking, less than 15 per cent of output was being 
exported … In an economy where around 70 per cent of households were 
both consumers and producers of rice, rises in rice output were important 
primarily for raising rural incomes and for food security, with the surplus 
available for export varying with fluctuations in domestic production.  
The state has played a role in encouraging new crops such as cashew, 
and later coffee.  …  Coffee is not straightforwardly a success story, 
though, as the expansion of Vietnam’s coffee exports in the mid-1990s 
was a factor in causing a substantial fall in the world price. 
Industrial development and structural change 
The strategic perspective in this important area suggests that the successful countries 
pursued, to various degrees, a continuously unfolding and dynamic set of policies with 
much trial and error. The retrospective attempts to tell a coherent story have often led to 
an overly deductive picture where good performances supposedly follow from a few, 
usually neoclassical economic principles. The Malaysian case study is a good and 
convincing counterexample. Jomo and Wee (2008: 10) describe some changes in 
strategy and policy for Malaysia within specific time-sensitive contexts: 
Over the years, the government has changed its industrialization strategy. 
In response to problems and new priorities, the government announced 
the Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) for 1996-2005 in December 
1996 to replace the (first) Industrial Master Plan (IMP) for 1986-95. In 
September 1996, the government had set up the Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC) to promote certain information technology investments. 
The government committed over RM50 billion for infrastructure 
development to support this initiative. At the same time, the government 
strengthened intellectual property laws to reassure foreign investors and 
provided more generous incentives for new investments in this area.  
Thus, the policy changes of the mid-1980s appeared successful in 
reviving growth and industrialization. Confirmation of the new policy 
direction from the mid-1980s came with the 1991 enunciation of Vision 
2020, favouring growth, modernization and industrialization. Although 
FDI began levelling off in the mid-1990s, increased domestic 
investments—inspired by greater domestic investor confidence—
sustained the momentum of rapid economic growth until the 1997-98 
regional crisis. The gravity of the crisis and the difficulties of recovery 
were exacerbated by injudicious policy responses, compromised by 
cronyism, though there is little persuasive evidence that cronyism itself 
precipitated the crisis. 
They also point out changes in the 1960s and 1970s as well in response to changing 
global economic environment: 
The decline of rubber prices in the 1960s must surely have affected 
economic performance and policy. Malaysia’s experiment with import-
substituting industrialization under foreign (principally British) auspices 
was quite different from most other developing countries where state-5 
owned enterprises played leading roles as well as Northeast Asian 
experiences where effective protection was conditional on export 
promotion. Malaysia’s transformation from net oil importer to exporter 
in the mid-1970s, when petroleum prices rose sharply, allowed the 
government to spend much more, while the recycling of petrodollars 
later allowed it to borrow from abroad at low cost until the Volcker 
intervention of 1980 raised real interest rates and precipitated a global 
recession, bringing commodity prices down (Jomo and Wee 2008: 14). 
The case study on Vietnam also confirms the suspicion that much was improvised and 
ad hoc during the earlier phases of apparently successful development cases. The lesson 
here perhaps is to avoid major resource allocation distortions (as also documented by 
the Thai case) and constant monitoring and policy revisions if existing policies do not 
work well. The political preconditions for this are in the background even in the 
Malaysia and Vietnam case studies, which are more explicit in this respect than the 
other two. 
Creation of technological capabilities 
Here the Korean case stands out as a very apt illustration of creating technological 
capabilities throughout the entire growth and development trajectory in definite stages.5 
As Lee (2008: 4-5) points out: 
Among various aspects of capacities, emphasis should be on 
technological capabilities because without these, sustained growth is 
impossible. In this era of open market competition, private companies 
cannot sustain growth if they rely upon cheap products; they need to be 
able to move up the value-chain to higher-value added goods based on 
continued upgrading and improvement and technological innovation. 
Furthermore, private companies had better be ‘local’ companies, 
whenever possible, including locally controlled JVs, not foreign 
controlled subsidiaries of the MNCs. MNCs subsidiaries are always 
moving around the world seeking cheaper wages and bigger markets. 
Therefore, they cannot be relied upon to generate sustained growth in 
specific localities or countries although they can serve as useful channels 
for knowledge transfer and learning. 
Malaysia also recognizes this essentially strategic aspect of creating technological 
capabilities during medium to long-run development. It is also clear from the Thailand 
and Vietnam cases that strategic concerns with the creation of appropriate technological 
capabilities have been and continue to be very important. 
Technological learning and innovation 
Promoting national innovation systems requires, in particular, the creation of specific 
institutions and technological learning over time. Ultimately, if development is to 
                                                 
5   See also Lee (2006) for a contrast of Korean experience with the Washington consensus and Khan 
2008, 2002, 1998 and 1997) for a discussion of the Korean (and Taiwanese) case(s) in the context of a 
distributionally sensitive growth model for positive feedback loop innovation system. 6 
continue beyond the catching-up phase, this may present the set of the most crucial 
policy challenges. Here, the study on Korea is an admirable attempt to sum up the 
lessons. There are specific features here to which Lee (2008: 5) draws our attention. 
Therefore, while the ultimate goal and criterion of development is to 
raise the capabilities of local private companies, the process needs pilot 
agencies to guide and coordinate the whole process. Such needs exist 
because key resources are so scarce, and thus had better … be mobilized 
for uses in sectors or projects with greatest externalities. As understood 
by Gerschenkron, who analysed the latecomer industrialization of 
Germany and Russia, and identified latecomer agencies, such as large 
state-owned investment banks to drive the process in these countries, it is 
such agencies that can make up for gaps or lacunae in the country that is 
seeking to industrialize. All the east Asian countries built specific state-
agencies that played a role in guiding the process of industrialization. In 
Korea the institutions established in the 1960s under the Park regime 
included the Economic Planning Board to set economic plans; the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry to support industrial policy and export; 
and the Ministry of Finance to finance economic plans.  
Both state and civil society have to play important roles. At an earlier stage, the state 
necessarily plays a large and activist role. At a later stage, however, the creation of 
technological capability has to rely on a private-public partnership at both the 
precompetitive and the competitive phases of innovation (Khan 2004a). 
Direct foreign investment (FDI) and foreign aid 
These factors have played a role for all four but perhaps more so for Thailand, Vietnam 
and Malaysia. Investment from abroad may have been more significant than aid per se. 
However, internal generation of investible funds and public sector support have also 
played a crucial role, particularly in Korea. FDI in the manufacturing sector can be 
important, as the Vietnam case (and also the Thai and Malaysian cases) shows: 
Sectorally, manufacturing has been the most important area for FDI, with 
51 per cent of accumulated registered foreign capital over the 1988-2006 
period, followed by transport, storage and communications (9.6 per 
cent), mining and quarrying (8 per cent) and real estate (8 per cent) 
(Thoburn 2008: 8). 
Not everything has to be of the best practice genre in order to attract DFI, as Thoburn 
shows for Vietnam: 
Paradoxically, Vietnam scores badly on conventional measures of 
competitiveness and investment climate, yet is highly regarded by 
foreign investors who operate in the country. The World Bank’s Doing 
Business survey ranks Vietnam as 104th out of 175 countries as a good 
place to do business. In contrast, the VDR for 2007 claims that Japanese 
inward investors see Vietnam as the third most attractive investment 
location in the world. It seems that Vietnam’s stable macroeconomic 
environment, high quality and low cost labour, and low levels of crime 
are more important considerations for investors than the details of 7 
bureaucratic procedures which are often included in international surveys 
(Thoburn 2008: 9). 
Foreign aid, particularly Japanese aid, has played a role in the development of Thailand 
and Malaysia but in the Asian cases the leveraging of aid for domestic development has 
perhaps been more important than the actual quantity of aid.6 
Poverty reduction strategies 
This is a varied set of policies that are necessary in addition to growth. Although growth 
is a very important component of such a strategic approach to poverty reduction, in all 
cases under review specific policies targeting both rural and urban poverty were 
undertaken. It can be argued that in the case of Thailand and Vietnam, such attention is, 
for some time to come, still a necessary part of a coherent pro-poor development 
strategy. This suggests a ‘growth plus…’ strategy (Weiss and Khan 2006) for 
development. 
In addition to the set of nine factors discussed above, there are also somewhat random, 
historically contingent factors. The paper on Malaysia acknowledges the presence of 
such factors explicitly. But even a quick look at the other cases reveals historically 
contingent events ranging from momentous events such as wars and revolutions to more 
usual changes in domestic and international political factors and changes in policies that 
depended on crucial personalities such as that of President Park in Korea in the 1960s. 
As Jomo and Wee (2008: 14) indicate in summing up the lessons from at least five 
different policy periods in Malaysia: 
It is difficult to evaluate policy success or failure simply in terms of 
subsequent economic performance. Malaysia’s very open economy has 
often been subjected to circumstances not of its own choosing or making.  
The decline of rubber prices in the 1960s must surely have affected 
economic performance and policy. Malaysia’s experiment with import-
substituting industrialization under foreign (principally British) auspices 
was quite different from most other developing countries where state-
owned enterprises played leading roles as well as Northeast Asian 
experiences where effective protection was conditional on export 
promotion. Malaysia’s transformation from net oil importer to exporter 
in the mid-1970s, when petroleum prices rose sharply, allowed the 
government to spend much more, while the recycling of petrodollars 
later allowed it to borrow from abroad at low cost until the Volcker 
intervention of 1980 raised real interest rates and precipitated a global 
recession, bringing commodity prices down.  
The Plaza Accord of September 1985 led to the strong yen just as 
Malaysia’s sovereign foreign debt became yen-denominated. The mid-
1980s’ recession precipitated a banking crisis, which led to the 1989 
banking reform to the seeming success of earlier deregulation facilitated 
                                                 
6   This is not to say that the quantity does not matter. Also for very poor countries today, aid can fill 
crucial financing gaps. See Khan (2003b) on these issues. 8 
financial liberalization, culminating in the 1997-98 crisis. The late 
1980s’ regulatory reforms encouraged further limited private foreign 
borrowings from abroad before that, limiting vulnerability on that front. 
The East Asian economic recovery from the last quarter of 1998, 
following the Russian and LTCM crises, similarly does not allow proper 
evaluation of the impact of Mahathir’s controversial measures of early 
September as he moved to politically eliminate his deputy. 
What follows from the above identification of both the relatively necessary as well as 
the more contingent factors that have played a role, I think, is the need to take a 
pragmatic and diagnostic approach to the problems of development. It is necessary to 
identify distortions. It is also equally important to identify market failures and other 
institutional failures. Instead of taking a grand, presumptive approach to development, a 
mix of heterodox policies and the willingness to revise policies before the cost becomes 
too high seems to be the best recipe for avoiding failures. 
In looking at institution-building in the four cases, it is also clear that it is generally 
easier to list the functions that good institutions perform than it is to describe the shape 
they should take. In fact, consistent with the complexity approach outlined here, there 
may be a wide variety of institutions serving roughly the same function. From the four 
cases studied here, it is apparent that the desirable institutions provide a rough and ready 
type of security of property rights, enforceability of contracts and lead to a gradual and 
strategically conceived integration with the world economy. In addition, they also help 
to maintain macroeconomic stability without a necessarily rigid conservative fiscal 
stance. Over time and given sufficient financial development, the state and private 
sector institutions should be able to manage risk-taking by financial intermediaries. In 
order to promote equitable growth there will also need to be institutions that can supply 
social insurance and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and 
accountability. But there is no one-size-fits-all for any of these functions.7 
As Warr insightfully points out in the concluding section of his study, rapid growth in 
the Thai case has also been accompanied by high inequality and environmental 
degradation. One important lesson that follows from this is that even if a country is 
successful in growing through a combination of strategies, policies and circumstances, 
without explicit attention to equity and ecology, sustainable growth and equitable 
development may not automatically occur but rather the contrary may happen.8 It is, 
then, an added imperative for the policymakers to include these salient goals in policy 
formulation and institution-building. While no predetermined futures are foreordained 
in this complex world, a thoughtful diagnosis of these problems at a relatively early 
stage may introduce solutions that can be implemented before it is too late. 
Summing up 
To sum up, the four papers reviewed here offer much concrete and wise analysis of the 
growth and development experiences of these four countries. Although no country can 
succeed by mechanically following the experience of another country, a number of 
                                                 
7   See Chang (2007) for a number of thoughtful contributions on this topic among other things. 
8   See also Jomo et al. (2004) and Khan (1997, 2004a, 2004b). 9 
helpful policy and institutional lessons can still be drawn. In the spirit of 
experimentation with rapid feedback and flexible policymaking informed by a strategic 
medium- to long-run perspective, much can be done by the policymakers who are both 
imaginative and pragmatic. Dynamic learning and flexible institution-building are 
essential components of such a strategic approach to development. 
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